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ABSTRACT Automatic speaker verification, like every other biometric system, is vulnerable to spoofing
attacks. Using only a few minutes of recorded voice of a genuine client of a speaker verification system,
attackers can develop a variety of spoofing attacks that might trick such systems. Detecting these attacks
using the audio cues present in the recordings is an important challenge. Most existing spoofing detection
systems depend on knowing the used spoofing technique. With this research, we aim at overcoming this
limitation, by examining robust audio features, both traditional and those learned through an autoencoder,
that are generalizable to different types of replay spoofing. Furthermore, we provide a detailed account of all
the steps necessary in setting up state-of-the-art audio feature detection, pre-, and postprocessing, such that
the (non-audio expert) machine learning researcher can implement such systems. Finally, we evaluate the
performance of our robust replay spoofing detection system with a wide variety and different combinations
of both extracted and machine learned audio features on the ‘out in the wild’ ASVspoof 2017 dataset.
This dataset contains a variety of new replay spoofing configurations. Since our focus is on examining
which features will ensure robustness, we base our system on a traditional Gaussian Mixture Model-
Universal Background Model (GMM-UBM). We then systematically investigate the relative contribution
of each feature set. The fused models, based on both the known audio features and the machine learned
features respectively, have a comparable performance with an Equal Error Rate (EER) of 12. The final best
performing model, which obtains an EER of 10.8, is a hybrid system that contains both known and machine
learned features, and is trained on an augmented dataset, thus revealing the importance of incorporating both
types of features when developing a robust spoofing prediction model.
INDEX TERMS Audio Classification, Audio Spoofing, Autoencoders, Countermeasures, Replay Attacks,
GMM-UBM.
I. INTRODUCTION
S INCE the dawn of Hacker Culture in the 50s and 60s [1],enthusiasts have challenged themselves to overcome the
limitations of software systems in order to achieve clever
and creative outcomes [2]. Security hackers in particular,
have posed a threat by breaching defenses and exploiting the
weaknesses in networks and systems. Biometric authentica-
tion systems such as automatic speaker verification (ASV)
are not exempt from this threat. For instance, in audio spoof-
ing attacks, fraudsters alter an audio recording of a voice,
such that it mimics a target speaker’s voice to access a system
protected by speaker verification [3], [4]. In replay attacks,
imposters present speech samples recorded from a genuine
client to a verification system [5]–[7].
Given the recent advances in audio processing technology,
it is becoming easier to synthesize speech such that it sounds
like a given target speaker. These technologies can be used
by security hackers to break into ASV systems [8], [9]. In
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addition to synthesizing speech, one could also use voice
conversion methods that enable the conversion of utterances
of one speaker to make them sound as if spoken by another
speaker [10]–[12]. Given these advances, it is important to
investigate whether we can discriminate original speech from
spoofed speech recordings, which is the problem we tackle in
this research. More specifically, our research contributes to a
robust system for audio spoofing detection without knowing
which spoofing technique is used in an attack. This challenge
gets even more complicated if the discrimination has to be
done only using only the audio data, without any other meta
data [13].
Existing countermeasures that try to detect specific spoof-
ing attacks typically make use of prior knowledge about
the used spoofing algorithm [14]–[17]. As a result, these
countermeasures are not generalizable to varying spoofing
attacks [18]. A countermeasure for audio spoofing detection
typically consists of two parts (see Figure 1). A first part
dealing with features extraction and pre/postprocessing of the
audio signal, and a second part consisting of a model that
determines whether the audio is genuine or spoofed. During
the system development, the spoofing prediction accuracy of
the model is often compared for different audio features, so
as to reach the highest accuracy [19], [20]. We make this
comparison explicit in our experiment section.
Developing spoofing prediction systems that are gener-
alizable to a varying range of spoofing techniques, hinges
on incorporating audio features that are robust, such that
they require little recalibration to detect novel spoofing at-
tacks [13], [21]. One way to achieve this robustness is by
investigating the spoofing detection performance when us-
ing various audio features. This is the key contribution of
this manuscript. We leverage the dataset from the Second
Automatic Speaker Verification Spoofing and Countermea-
sures Challenge, ASVspoof 2017 [22], and investigate the
performance a wide variety of audio features on different
types of replay spoofing attacks. In addition using a variety
of traditional audio features, we train an autoencoder and use
it to augment the training dataset.
The second step in developing a spoofing countermeasure
is to use the extracted audio features to train a spoofing pre-
diction model. The models typically used in speech/speaker
related applications have evolved a lot over the past 40 years.
In the past, researchers often used systems based on Discrete
Vector Quantization (VQ) [23]. The state-of-the-art then
moved to Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) solutions [24],
and more recently into factor analysis based on i-vector
frameworks [25]. In this research, we explore the effect of
different audio features in a GMM system.
The ASVspoof 2017 database was designed mainly to
assess the detection accuracy of replay spoofing attacks es-
pecially for ‘out in the wild’ conditions, meaning without
knowing the exact spoofing technique configuration used in
the replay attack. In order to do so, the majority of test-
ing data included in this database originates from different,
unseen configurations of the spoofing algorithms compared
to the training and development set [13]. Such ‘out in the
wild’ conditions often necessitate a new audio feature space
to accommodate for different replay spoofing techniques,
and typically results in inferior performance when evaluating
the models. This again confirms the need for a generalized
countermeasure. Such a countermeasure could be achieved
either by identifying robust audio features, or by improving
an automatically learned feature space of spoofed recordings
through an autoencoder. In this research, we explore both
approaches in depth.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
developed spoofing detection system is described in Sec-
tion II and III. These sections include an overview of the
audio features used in this investigation and description of
the automatic feature extraction process. We provide a very
thorough description of, not only how to extract and learn
audio features, but also which pre- and postprocessing steps
are required for obtaining the best results, thus providing
guidance for the audio laymen to tackle this type of spoofing
challenge. In addition, this section describes the implemented
autoencoder, and how it can be used to augment the dataset.
Details about the experimental setup can be found in Sec-
tion IV, which describes the dataset used in this investigation.
The next section describes the results (Section V), in which
we discuss the most robust features. Finally, Section VI
contains our conclusions and final remarks.
II. A ROBUST HYBRID REPLAY SPOOFING DETECTION
ARCHITECTURE
The hybrid spoofing detection system developed in this paper
consists of two branches that each have a unique way of
processing the input audio files (see Figure 1). Large sets
of selected audio features are first extracted from the prepro-
cessed audio files. These features are less redundant and more
compact than the original audio signal. In the first arm of the
algorithm, the audio features are postprocessed and passed
along to the prediction module. In the second arm, however,
they are first fed to an autoencoder before postprocessing. For
both arms of the algorithm, a GMM-UBM model is built (see
Section II-B) that can predict the authenticity of a given audio
file. Finally, both model outputs are fed to a fusion model,
which will calculate a hybrid estimation of authenticity.
In what follows, we describe the different modules of our
spoofing detection system in more detail, followed by an in-
depth account of the extracted audio features.
A. FEATURE PROCESSING
The first part of our system relates to audio feature process-
ing and consists of a number of steps, as described below.
Figure 2 zooms in on the audio processing module in arm 1,
without autoencoder.
1) Audio preprocessing
The audio preprocessing module consists of two parts: pre-
emphasizing and enhancing the audio file. The audio record-
ings present in the corpus are first pre-emphasized by ap-
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Figure 1: Creating a spoofing detection system 
2.1. Feature Processing 
2.1.1. Audio pre-processing 
Audio pre-processing consists of two parts - pre-emphasizing the audio file and enhancing the audio 
file. Audio recordings present in the corpus were pre-emphasized by applying a first order 
difference equation [25]. The main aim of pre-emphasis is to boost amount of energy present in the 
high frequencies. The recordings were further enhanced by removing the noise using spectral noise 
subtraction method. An estimate of noise spectrum is subtracted from the speech power spectrum 
and set the negative differences to zero. This new power spectrum was then recombined with the 
original phase of the audio signal to reconstruct the enhanced time waveform [26, 27]. Upon 
listening, this noise supressed audio signals were found to have a better quality and intelligibility. 
We used MATLAB implementation from ‘VOICEBOX tool box for speech processing’ for 
achieving this [28].  
2.1.2. Audio feature extraction  
The enhanced audio signals were divided into frames to achieve stationarity. A hamming window 
was then applied. A number of audio features have then been extracted from every frame. These 
include mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs), spectrogram, constant Q cepstral coefficients 
(CQCCs), linear predictive cepstral coefficients (LPCCs), inverted mel-frequency cepstral 
coefficients (IMFCCs), rectangular filter cepstral coefficients (RFCCs), linear filter cepstral 
coefficients (LFCCs), sub-band centroid frequency coefficients (SCFCs), sub-band centroid 
magnitude coefficients (SCMCs) and complex cepstral coefficients (CCs). A 50% frame overlap 
was also used in this investigation. Detailed explanation of these features can be found in the 
following subsections.  
2.1.3. Audio feature post-processing 
In order to further reduce the distortion caused by noise contamination, audio features extracted 
from every frame were mean and variance normalized. Here the features were linearly transformed 
to have the same segmental statistics of zero mean and unit variance. It was reported that such post-
processing can significantly improve the performance of speaker/speech recognition systems [29, 
30]. Figure 2 shows the whole audio pre-processing and feature extraction process. 
FIGURE 1. Architecture of proposed spoofing detection system.
4 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Audio pre-processing, audio feature extraction and audio feature post-processing 
2.2. Feature modelling and model verification  
As mentioned earlier, feature modelling and verification (i.e., score prediction) form the heart of 
most of the spoofing detection system. We used GMM-UBM for this investigation. Creating a 
GMM-UBM model is a two-stag  proc ss. Firstly, a universal background model (UBM) is created 
using a pool of training data. This pool includes both genuine and spoofed recordings and as a result 
this background model in a way summarizes the feature space of both genuine and spoofed 
recordings. UBM is a Gaussian mixture model created using binary splitting expectation-
maximization (EM) procedure [21, 31]. In the second part of GMM creation, recording-specific 
(genuine/spoofed) models will be created by adapting the UBM using maximum a posteriori (MAP) 
estimation. In the verification phase, audio features extracted from test segments are scored against 
each of these recording models.  
 
Figure 3 GMM creation and the model verification process 
 
The modelling and verification process are shown in Figure 3 and can be summarized as follows. 
Audio features that are extracted from the whole training audio samples are used to create a 
universal background model (!). From this !, a genuine recording model (!") and a spoofed 
recording model (!#)  are created using MAP adaptation procedure using genuine and spoofed 
audio features, respectively. !"  and !# are then used to score a test data (i.e., u (unknown), see 
Figure 3). One has to keep in mind that a similar feature processing step is put in place for 
extracting audio features from this test data. A probability score for ‘u’, given !" 	 (i.e.,	$(&/!")) 
FIGURE 2. Architecture of the feature processing unit, which includes audio preprocessing, audio feature extraction, and audio feature postprocessing.
plying a firs order difference equation [26]. The main goal
of pre-emphasis is to boost the amount of energy present in
the high frequencies. Th recordings are further enhanced by
removing the noise using a spectral noise subtraction method
whereby an estimate of the noise spectrum is subtracted from
the speech p wer spectrum and the negative differences are
set to zero. This new power spectrum is then recombined with
the original phas of the audio signal so as to reconstruct
an enhanced version of the time waveform [27], [28]. This
preprocessing module is implemented using the ‘Voicebox
tool box for spe ch processing’ in Matlab [29].
2) Audio feature extraction
The enhanced audio signals are divided into frames, so as to
form segments which are more stationary. Next, a hamming
window is applied, with 50% overlap. A large number of
audio features, 11 feature sets in total, are then extracted
from every frame. These feature sets include mel-frequency
cepstral coefficients (MFCCs), spectrogram, constant Q cep-
stral coefficients (CQCCs), linear predictive cepstral coeffi-
cients (LPCCs), inverted mel-frequency cepstral coefficients
(IMFCCs), rectangular filter cepstral coefficients (RFCCs),
linear filter cepstral coefficients (LFCCs), sub-band centroid
frequency coefficients (SCFCs), sub-band centroid magni-
tude coefficients (SCMCs), and complex cepstral coefficients
(CCs). A more detailed explanation of these features can be
found in Section III.
3) Autoencoder
In the second arm of the system, we insert a pretrained
autoencoder before feature postprocessing, as is displayed in
Figure 3. An autoencoder is a special type of feedforward
neural network with fully connected layers that is trained by
matching its input to its output [30], [31]. The encoder com-
presses th input into a lower-dimensional space (also called
‘code’), which can then be used by the decoder to reconstruct
the output. After training, the output of an autoencoder will
typically not be exactly the same as the original input, but it
will be a closely resembling, slightly degraded version of the
input [30], [31]. In addition to lear ing new featur s (i.e., the
code), the autoencoder is also used to augment the dataset, as
explained in Section III-C.
4) Audio feature postprocessing
In order to further reduce any distortion of the data caused
by noise contamination, the original audio features (arm
1) or the encoder features (arm 2) are mean and variance
normalized. This is achieved by linearl ransforming the
features such that they have the same statistics within the
segment. It was reported that such postprocessing can sig-
nificantly improve the performance of speaker/speech recog-
nition systems [32], [33]. Figure 2 outlines the entire audio
preprocessing and feature extraction process in arm 1.
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GMM, and this new model was then used to score features from test input and EER is determined. 
The motivation behind the use of auto-encoder to see if it can improve the feature space 
characteristics of genuine/spoof recordings and thereby improving the model score output. More 
details of auto-encoder can be found in the following section.  
Third experiment is the fusion of experiment 1 and 2. Here the scores produced for test inputs from 
experiment 1 and that from experiment 2 were fused using logistic-regression fusion to find out if 
there is any further improvement in classification performance.  
Block diagram for experimental methodology is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 Experimental Methodology 
 
3.3.1. Creating artificial features using auto-encoder   
Auto-encoders are a special type of feedforward neural networks where the input is the same as the 
output. Auto-encoder works by compressing the input into a lower-dimensional space (usually 
called as code) and then reconstruct the output from this sparse representation. The encoder in the 
auto-encoder compresses the input to create a code. A decoder then reconstructs the input using this 
code. The output of an auto-encoder won’t be the same as that of the input, but it will be a degraded 
version of the input [23, 24].   A basic auto-encoder is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 A typical auto-encoder 
 
 
In an auto-encoder, the encoder and decoder and fully-connected feedforward neural networks. 
Typically, the decoder architecture is some-what mirror image of the encoder. A number of hyper-
parameter need to set before the training phase. These include code-size, number of layers in 
encoder, number of nodes per layer and loss-function [58, 59]. Figure 6 shows the auto-encoder 
used in our experiments for a particular feature vector. 
 
FIGURE 3. The autoencoder arm of the proposed robust hybrid spoofing detection system.
B. FEATURE MODELLING AND PREDICTION
1) GMM-UBM
The second module of the system performs the actual spoof-
ing detection. We use a GMM-UBM for this investigation,
which is created for each of the 11 feature sets in a two-
stage process. Firstly, a universal background model (UBM)
is created using the entire training set for a given feature
set. As this pool includes both genuine and spoofed data,
the resulting background model captures the feature space of
both types of recordings. UBM is a Gaussian Mixture Model
created using a binary splitting expectation-maximization
(EM) procedure [24], [34]. In the second stage, two GMM
models, one for genuine and one for spoofed recordings,
will be created by adapting the UBM using maximum a
posteriori (MAP) estimation to fit the respective data. Finally,
in the prediction phase, the likelihood of the audio features
extracted from test segments can be calculated based on each
of the two models. The ratio of both of these likelihood
probabilities is indicative of the predicted class.
The process of creating the initial GMM models, one for
each feature set, and predicting the class for a new instance
is shown in Figure 4. In a first step, the postprocessed audio
features from the training set are used to create a universal
backgrou d odel (λ). From this λ, a genui e recording
model (λG) and a spoofed recording model (λS) are created
using the maximum a posteriori (MAP) adaptation procedure
with genuine and spoofed audio features, respectively. These
λG and λS can then be used to calculate the log-likelihood
of a test audio file u (see Figure 4). For λG this results in
p(u/λG)) and for λS the probability is p(u/λS). The ratio of
both of these probabilities, p(u/λG)p(u/λS) can be used to predict the
class.
A number of parameters need to be set when creating
UBM models. These include the number of Gaussian com-
ponents and the number of expectation maximization (EM)
iterations in the final binary split. Even though the number of
Gaussian components required to model various audio fea-
tures is different, we decided to set this number to 64, based
on our investigation of audio samples from the development
set. The number of EM iterations was set to 30.
2) Fusion model
Given that we create 22(11 + 11) individual GMM-UBM
models, 11 for each feature set in arm 1 and 11 for each
feature set after the autoencoder in arm 2, a fusion model
is needed to merge the individual prediction results. We
included a logistic regression fusion procedure [35], [36] to
make a final prediction.
For this procedure, we determine the fusion parameters
(i.e., weights for the likelihood of each separate model, and
a shifting factor), using the development set. These fusion
parameters are then used to combine multiple likelihoods,
one corresponding to the model for each feature set, to
produce a final likelihood, which will determine if the audio
file is spoofed or genuine.
III. KNOWN VERSUS LEARNED AUDIO FEATURES
The extracted audio features, together with the learned en-
coded representation from the autoencoder are discussed
below. Finally, we describe how the autoencoder was us d
to augment the dataset and create a new set of instances for
training.
A. EXISTING AUDIO FEATURES
A total of 11 sets of known features are extracted from the
dataset. Below we discuss each of these feature sets.
1) Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs)
The first set of features, consisting of MFCCs, focuses on the
perceptually relevant aspects of the speech spectrum. They
are arguably the most commonly used speech features in the
speech/speaker recognition arena [37], [38]. The extraction
4 VOLUME 4, 2016
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Figure 2 Audio pre-processing, audio feature extraction and audio feature post-processing 
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The modelling and verification process are shown in Figure 3 and can be summarized as follows. 
Audio features that are extracted from the whole training audio samples are used to create a 
universal background model (!). From this !, a genuine recording model (!") and a spoofed 
recording model (!#)  are created using MAP adaptation procedure using genuine and spoofed 
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FIGURE 4. Spoofing prediction using a GMM-UBM.
process of MFCCs can be summarized as follows. First,
the Discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of the input audio
frame is taken to obtain the audio spectrum. This spectrum
will indicate the amount of energy present in the various
frequency bands. As the human hearing is very sensitive
to lower frequencies, but less able to distinguish adjacent
high frequency sounds, it was chosen to use a representa-
tion that accounts for this: mel-spectrum. To calculate this
representation, the spectrum is warped into a mel sc le, by
using a bank of triangular filters (i.e., a set of overlapped
non-linear mel-filter banks whose bandwidth gets narrow at
low frequencies and wider at higher frequencies). Once the
spectrum is warped, the logarithm of the energy present in the
various regions of the speech spectrum is estimated. Finally,
this log spectrum is transformed back to the time domain,
thus resulting in MFCCs [39].
In the speech recognition arena, it is common to use the
first 12-14 MFCCs extracted from a stationary speech frame
along with their deltas (first derivatives) and delta-deltas. The
first and second derivatives of the MFCCs carry information
about speech dynamics. In this paper, we used 24 mel-filters
and extracted 13 MFCCs together with the energy of every
frame (i.e., the zeroth MFCC corresponds to energy present
in the frame). By including the deltas and delta-deltas (i.e.,
the first and second order derivatives of MFCCs) there will be
a total of 42 features per frame (i.e., 14 MFCCs, 14 deltas and
14 delta-deltas). Mathematically, MFCC feature extraction
can be summarized as follows [39], [40]:
MFCC(q) =
M∑
m=1
log [MF(m)] cos
{
q(m− 0.5)pi
M
}
(1)
MF(m) =
K∑
k=1
|XDFT(k)|2Hm(k) (2)
whereby Hm(k) is the mth mel-filter bank, MF(m) is
the mel-frequency spectrum, M is the number of mel-filter
banks, q the number of MFCCs, k is the DFT index and K
is the total number of DFT indices, XDFT is the DFT of input
audio frame.
2) Other Ceptral Coefficients related to MFCCs
In addition to MFCCs, we also included Rectangular Filt r
Cepstral Coefficients (RFCCs), Linear Filter Cepstral Coeffi-
cients (LFCCs) and Inverted Mel-frequency Cepstral Coeffi-
cients (IMFCCs). The extraction process of these feature sets
is very similar to that of MFCCs. There are, however, subtle
differences in the selection of filters and the chosen frequency
scale [19]. For instance, RFCCs use a bank of 24 uniform
non-overlapping rectangular filters distributed over a linear
frequency scale. The procedure for calculating LFCCs is sim-
ilar to that of RFCCs [41], however, it uses triangular filters
instead of rectangular filters [19], [42]. Finally, to calculate
IMFCCs, overlapping triangular filters are linearly placed
over an inverted-mel scale [43]. This means that IMFCCs will
emphasize the higher frequency region of the spectrum, i.e.,
opposite to human perception. Similar to MFCCs, we have
also used the deltas and delta-deltas of these audio features
in our experiments.
3) Spectrogram
Spectrograms provide a visual representation of the spec-
trum of frequencies present in an audio signal over time.
They are nowadays widely used as features in image/audio
classification and separation systems [44], [45]. When tested
on a sound event or speech classification task, they have
shown to provide a significant improvement in classification
performance when supplemented with other traditional audio
features such as MFCCs and LPCCs [46], [47]. In this paper,
we obtain the spectrum of an audio signal by calculating
the short-time Fourier transform (STFT) of the audio input.
This can then be unwrapped to get the amplitude and phase
information [18]. Both of these are considered as separate
features for this investigation.
VOLUME 4, 2016 5
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4) Constant Q Cepstral Coefficients (CQCCs)
CQCCs make use of a perceptually motivated time-
frequency analysis known as constant Q transform (CQT).
The frequency bins in Fourier-based approaches are of-
ten regular spaced and will result in a variable Q factor(
Q = centerfrequencyofbandbandwidth
)
[18], [48], [49], based on the
center frequency of each particular band. In CQT, however,
the bins are spaced geometrically, in order to ensure a con-
stant Q factor. In stark contrast to the Fourier approach, CQT
offers a higher frequency resolution at lower frequencies
and a higher temporal resolution at higher frequencies. The
extraction process of CQCCs begins by taking the constant-
Q-transform of the input audio frame. The power spectrum
is then computed and its logarithm is calculated. Since the
k bins in a constant Q transforms are each on a different
scale, the log power spectrum has to be resampled before
applying the discrete cosine transform (DCT). This resam-
pling is achieved by converting the geometric space to linear
space. This involves a down-sampling operation over the first
k bins (i.e., the low frequency part) and an up-sampling
operation for the remaining bins (i.e., the high frequency).
This linearization of the frequency scale of the CQT further
preserves the orthogonality of the DCT outputs [48]. In this
investigation, 20 CQCCs, their deltas and delta-deltas have
been extracted from each audio frame, thus forming a total of
60 features.
5) Linear predictive cepstral coefficients (LPCCs)
Another standard set of features widely used in speech
recognition are LPCCs [39], [50]. They are computed from
the smoothed auto-regressive power spectrum of an audio
frame. LPCC extraction begins with the estimation of the
linear predictive coding (LPC) coefficients of an audio frame.
These linear predictive coefficients are converted to LPCCs
by using a recursion algorithm as shown below [51]. In
this investigation, 16 LPCCs have been extracted from every
audio frame.
Consider the speech input s(n) to an all-pole LPC filter,
which has p linear predictive coefficients, and a prediction
error signal of e(n). Let Ee be the power of this error signal.
Now the p coefficients [a0, a1, . . . , ap−1] can be recursively
converted to n LPCCs [L0, L1, . . . , Ln−1] as follows for each
LPCC.
For m = 0:
Lm = ln(Ee) (3)
For 1 ≤ m ≤ p:
Lm = −am + 1
m
m−1∑
k=1
{−(m− k)akLm−k} (4)
For p < m < n:
Lm =
1
m
p∑
k=1
{
− (m− k)
m
akLm−k
}
(5)
6) Spectral sub-band Centroid Coefficients
Spectral sub-band centroids, as the name suggest, represent
the centroids of selected sub-bands of the spectrum. Both
spectral sub-band centroid magnitude (SCM) and spectral
sub-band centroid frequency (SCF) can be extracted from a
given sub-band, whereby the characteristics of the latter one
are similar to that of formant frequency [19], [52]. Sub-band
centroid features, supplemented with cepstral features, have
shown to work very well for speech recognition [53].
The SCMC and SCFC extraction process starts by creating
the spectrum for a given speech frame and dividing this into k
sub-bands, whereby each sub-band is defined by a fixed lower
edge and an upper edge frequency. SCFC is then calculated
from the average frequency for each sub-band, and weighted
by the normalized energy of each frequency component in
that sub-band. Similarly, SCMC is calculated as the average
magnitude of each sub-band, weighted by the frequency of
each magnitude component in that sub-band. For calculating
the SCMC, we then take the logarithm of this result and
apply DCT [19], [52]. For our experiments, we have used
8,192 bins (sub-bands) of spectrum extracted from every
20ms audio frame.
7) Complex Cepstral cofficients (CCCs)
Cepstral analysis, often referred to as homomorphic filter-
ing [54], can be used to separate out various components in
a speech production (i.e., source-filter) model. The Complex
Cepstrum is defined as the inverse Fourier transform (IFT)
of the logarithm of the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) of a
signal [55]. By taking the FFT of the speech signal, the con-
volution between the source and filter components in the time
domain will be converted into their product in the frequency
domain. The logarithm operator then transforms this product
operation into a sum operation of both components. Finally,
an IFT is taken to bring these summed components back into
the time domain (quefrency domain) [56].
The resultant complex cepstral coefficients (CCs) charac-
terize the slow and fast varying components of speech. Slow-
varying components (e.g. contribution of pitch) are concen-
trated in the upper part of the cepstral domain, whereas the
fast-varying components (e.g. contribution of the vocal tract
filter) are concentrated in the lower part [55]. Since CCs
carry more speech specific information than most of the other
cepstral coefficients that we discussed above, they typically
result in higher speaker recognition performance [57]. In
the experiments below, we have used the lower 50 cepstral
coefficients extracted from every frame.
B. LEARNED FEATURE REPRESENTATION
An autoencoder is trained for each feature set, such that a
dense presentation of all original audio features is learned.
Each of these resulting dense representations (one per feature
set) are then concatenated to form the input for the final
classification model.
To be able to train the autoencoders, a number of hyper-
parameters are set, including encoding-size (code-size =
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100), number of layers in encoder and subsequently the
decoder (one layer for each), number of nodes per layer
(ten per layer), and loss-function [58], [59]. Figure 5 shows
the autoencoder architecture used in our experiments for a
particular feature vector of size 1× n.
FIGURE 5. Architecture of the autoencoder used in this investigation, for a
feature vector of size n.
In the figure, the size of the input feature vector is 1 × n.
The code-size is set to 100, and the encoder/decoder each
consist of 1 layer. Mean squared error (MSE) is used as
the loss function. MSE is the recommended loss function
for cases in which the input values are in the range of zero
to one [31]. In this example, the encoder compresses the
original 1 × n input to a lower dimensional code (in this
case of size 100) and the decoder reconstructs the output
of size 1 × n using this code. The encoder will be trained
until it reaches the performance target. In our case, this in
turn corresponds to achieving the lowest gradient, which
corresponds to the lowest loss in prediction error. To finish
the training in a finite time, the maximum number of epochs
in the training phase is set to 200. This training cutoff was set
after careful investigation of the evolution of the MSE loss
when using different training samples, corresponding to each
of the feature vectors. We found that the MSE is very low
for 200 epochs and did not change too much in subsequent
epochs.
C. DATA AUGMENTATION
In addition to creating a new, dense representation, the
autoencoder trained on genuine recordings is also used to
augment our dataset (see Figure 6). This is achieved by using
the autoencoder to reconstruct the feature sets for the 1, 508
genuine recordings in the original training set. These 1, 508
reconstructions are then added to the training set. A similar
procedure is performed on the spoofed recordings.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We investigate the influence of both the known and learned
feature representations on spoofing detection accuracy.
The setup of our experiment, including dataset, evaluation
methodology, are discussed below.
A. AUDIO DATASET - ASVSPOOF 2017
The ‘out in the wild’ ASVspoof 2017 dataset (protocol V2)
is used for our experiments [60]. This corpus originated
from RedDots corpus3 and contains recordings collected by
researchers using Android mobile phones [61], [62]. The
recordings include both replayed (spoofed) and non-replayed
(original) utterances. The former (i.e., replayed) are captured
versions of the original RedDots recordings, meaning that an
utterance of an original target speaker was replayed through
transducers of varying quality, and recorded using a mobile
phone), whereas the latter (i.e., non-replayed utterances)
are original recordings. Replayed utterances can be used to
model a ‘stolen voice’.
We chose to work with this dataset, as it contains audio
from different, unseen configurations of the spoofing algo-
rithms in the testing set. The aim of this paper is to assess the
validity of different audio features when building a robust
spoofing detection model, which remains effective without
knowing which spoofing technique was used.
The ASVspoof corpus is divided into three subsets: train-
ing, development and testing set. The training and develop-
ment set are used to train and validate our spoofing detection
system, whereas the testing set is used to test the perfor-
mance. Since heterogeneity in the data is highly essential for
developing reliable spoofing countermeasures, no two-same-
speaker recordings are included in any of the three subsets.
Further, the data collection sites are also chosen to be distinct
for all the three subsets [13], [60]. More information about
corpus is shown in Table 1.
B. EQUAL ERROR RATE (EER) AS THE EVALUATION
METRIC
The Equal Error Rate (EER) is used as the primary metric
to evaluate the performance of our spoofing detection sys-
tem [13], [63]. The false positive rate (pfp(θ)) and false
negative rate (pfn(θ)) at a particular threshold are required
to calculate EER:
pfp(θ) =
Number of replay trials with likelihood > θ
Total number of replay trials
(6)
pfn(θ) =
Number of non-replay trials with likelihood ≤ θ
Total number of non-replay trials
(7)
The EER corresponds to the particular value of θ for which
pfp(θ) and pfn(θ) are approximately equal. The lower the
EER value, the better is the performance of the system. In this
paper, the term ‘performance’ refers to EER results, which
can be seen as a measure of accuracy.
C. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
In order to thoroughly examine the effect of different audio
features and the autoencoder, a total of three experiments are
conducted, as represented in Figure 3.
In Experiment 1, the audio features explained in Sec-
tion III-A are extracted from the training set and postpro-
cessed to create individual feature-specific GMM models.
This means that a UBM is created for each set of features
(e.g. MFCCs, CQCCs, etc.), using the 1, 508 genuine and
1, 508 spoofed audio files in the training set. We evaluate and
compare the performance of models based on each of these
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Figure 6 Architecture of the auto-encoder used in this investigation 
 
Here the size of the input feature vector is 1 × 9000 (9000 is just an example number). The encoder 
contains only one layer. The code size used was 100. The smaller the code size the more will be the 
compression. Mean squared error (MSE) was used as the loss function. MSE is the recommended 
loss function unless the input values are between the range zero and one [24]. In this example, 
encoder compresses 1× 9000 to a lower dimensional code (in this case to 100) and the decoder 
reconstructs the output of size 1 × 9000	using this code. The encoder will be trained until it reaches 
the performance target. In our case, this is about achieving lowest gradient that corresponds to the 
least loss in prediction. However, to produce the output in a finite time, the maximum number of 
epochs in the training phase was set to 200. This is after careful investigation of MSE loss produced 
for training input samples corresponding to each of the feature vector. For samples that are checked, 
MSE was found to be very low for 200 epochs and not changing too much between epochs. 
 
We have used separate auto-encoder for genuine and spoofed recordings and can be visualized as 
follows. Firstly, an auto-encoder was used to reconstruct a particular feature set for genuine 
recordings as shown in Figure 7. The final feature set for genuine recordings would be the 
concatenation of the original 1508 × ^ and newly constructed 1508 × ^, i.e., 3016 × ^ (1508 is the 
number of genuine recordings in training set and ^ is the number of particular features extracted per 
audio recording). 
 
 
Figure 7 Auto-encoder usage in this investigation 
 
Using another auto-encoder, a new set of audio feature set was then reconstructed from the spoofed 
recordings in the training set.  So, with the auto encoder in place, there would be 3016 × ^ features 
for training the spoofed model, again ^ is the number of particular features extracted per audio 
recording. The rest of the methodology follows similar to that of experiment 1. For e.g. UBM will 
be created using features extracted from both 3016 genuine and 3016 spoofed audio files. From this 
UBM, genuine recordings model and spoofed recordings model are created using features from 
3016 genuine recordings and 3016 spoofed recordings, respectively. This model would capture 
more feature specific characteristics since it was trained using larger number of samples. Similar to 
experiment 1, this model is then used to score the test samples. 
 
FIGURE 6. Data augmentation (with n number of features, and 1, 508 original genuine recordings). A similar procedure is performed on the spoofed recordings.
TABLE 1. Statistics of ASVspoof 2017 database.
Subset Number of speakers Number of replay Number of replay Number of non-replay Number of replaysessions configuration utterances utteran es
Training 10 6 3 1,508 1,508
Development 8 10 10 760 950
Testing 24 163 112 1,298 12,008
features separately. In addition, we explore a fused model that
takes as input the likelihoods corresponding to the models of
all of the feature sets investigated.
In the second experiment, an autoencoder is used to learn a
new representation for each of the original feature sets, and to
augment the training set. We again evaluate the performance
of each feature set, and compare this to a hybrid system that
is obtained by fusing the individual likelihoods obtained per
feature set.
The third experiment is a fusion of all the results from
Experiment 1 and 2, whereby the GMM-UBM likelihoods
for each of the models based on individual features sets are
combined using a logistic regression fusion.
V. RESULTS
We discuss the performance of the different features through
three experiments as described below, followed by a compar-
ison with other state-of-the-art models.
A. EXPERIMENT 1: PERFORMANCE OF KNOWN AUDIO
FEATURES
The performance of models built on each of the different
feature sets is displayed in Table 2. The model based on
CQCCs performs best. This result aligns with previous stud-
ies conducted in this arena [40], [48].
Interestingly, the performance of the model based on
MFCCs, one of the de-facto features extracted in many of
the speech/speaker recognition, is found to be the worst.
As explained earlier, MFCCs capture perceptually relevant
aspects of the speech spectrum. In a replay attack scenario,
the imposter is playing speech samples captured from a
genuine speaker, hence, it could be expected that the per-
ceptual/ audible artifacts would be the same as that of the
original audio, which explains the low performance when
using MFCCs.
Three models based on cepstral co-efficients (RFCCs,
LFCCs and IMFCCs), whose extraction process is very sim-
ilar to that of MFCCs yet uses a different selection of filters
and frequency scales, perform well. Among these three, the
inverted-MFCCs, which models characteristics opposite to
human perception, is the best performer. This falls in line
with our previous hypothesis that replayed audio may have
inaudible artifacts and that IMFCCs might be capturing cues
outside of human perception.
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SCFCs 24.0 
CCCs 25.9 
Fused result 12.2 
 
Results of the experiment 1 is graphically shown using detection error tradeoff (DET) graph (See 
Figure 8). DET graphs are used for showing the performance of detection tasks that involve a 
tradeoff of error types. Error rates (i.e., false negative rate and false positive rate, uniformly treated 
aprior) are plot one against the other in a DET graph. EER can be computed from such DET graph 
and this is the point where percentage of false negative rate equals false positive rate [60]. The 
closer the graphs towards the origin (i.e., less number of false negative and false positives) the 
better would be the performance.  
 
Figure 8 DET Curves showing the performance of detection tasks (Experiment 1)  FIGURE 7. DET Curves s owing the performance of spoofi g the detection
models for Experiment 1.
The model based on spectral amplitude is a good candidate
to distinguish spoofed recordings from genuine. A related
model, using spectral phase information, however, did not
perform up to the expectations set in [18].
The performance of models that use features based on
spectral sub-band centroids (e.g. SCMCs and SCFCs) is
similar, with a slight edge for amplitude based features (i.e.,
SCMCs) versus frequency based features (i.e., SCFCs). This
trend is also observed when comparing spectral amplitude
versus spectral phase. The effect can be due to the way
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TABLE 2. Results from Experiment 1.
Features EER
MFCCs 27.2
CQCCs 17.5
Spectrogram - Amplitude 20.9
Spectrogram - Phase 26.8
LPCCs 26.1
RFCCs 20.3
LFCCs 19.0
IMFCCs 18.1
SCMCs 21.1
SCFCs 24.0
CCCs 25.9
Fused result 12.2
The features resulting in the three best performing
models are indicated in bold.
that an imposter tries to capture genuine speech samples, as
the energy/amplitude of the captured speech will be directly
related to the placement of the capturing device with respect
to the mouth position of the genuine speaker. This could be
reflected in the extracted features.
Finally, models built using complex cepstral coefficients
and LPCCs do not perform as to expected. The former are
expected to carry more speech specific information. The
latter inherit advantages of LPC (i.e., linear prediction coef-
ficients), which are related to the speech production (source-
filter) model. Both of these features result in models with a
similar performance to those using MFCCs.
In order to achieve better spoofing detection performance
and to overcome the limitation in performance of individual
features, the results from models based on different feature
sets have been merged using logistic regression fusion. As
expected, the resulting hyrbid model has a far better overall
performance.
The results of Experiment 1 are visualised in Figure 7 by
using an detection error trade-off (DET) graph. DET graphs
show the performance of detection tasks that involve a trade-
off error. In this case, false negative and false positive rates
for each set of features are plotted against each other in the
DET graph. The EER can be observed from the DET graph
as the point where the percentage of false negatives equals
the false positive rate [64]. Better performance is reflected
by closer proximity to the origin. This graph confirms our
previous conclusions and identifies the fused model as the
best performing.
B. EXPERIMENT 2: PERFORMANCE WITH
AUTOENCODER FEATURES AND DATA AUGMENTATION
Based on the increased popularity of latent neural network
representations, we expected a steep increase in performance
when building the model using machine learned features, and
including data augmentation. According to our results listed
in Table 3 and Figure 8, this is, however, not the case for
spoofing detection, at least not when using only these new,
learned features. None of the models built using the new
feature sets and augmented dataset, are able to match the
performance of CQCC in Experiment 1. The performance
of the model with an autoencoder based on CQCC features
in Experiment 2 is slightly below that of Experiment 1.
Models with average performance in Experiment 1 (e.g.,
SCFC, CCCs, LPCCs), keep a similar ranking in experiment
2, however, their absolute EER performance is compromised.
The reason for this decreased performance may be related to
the fact that there is a higher variance in the machine learned
features compared to the original features, which can cause a
drop in performance. This warrants further investigation. The
models based on spectral amplitude and MFCCs are the only
ones that increase their performance in terms of EER when
compared to that of Experiment 1.
TABLE 3. Results from Experiment 2.
Features EER
MFCCs 24.2
CQCCs 21.5
Spectrogram - Amplitude 20.2
Spectrogram - Phase 26.5
LPCCs 31.2
RFCCs 27.9
LFCCs 24.0
IMFCCs 21.6
SCMCs 23.0
SCFCs 35.9
CCCs 32.0
Fused result 12.6
The features resulting in the three best performing
models are indicated in bold.
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Figure 10 Ranking of audio features based on their EER performance (a) with no auto-generated 
features (i.e., corresponding to Experiment 1) (b) with auto-generated features (i.e., 
corresponding to Experiment 2)  
 
 
  
FIGURE 8. DET Curves showing the performance f the spoofing detection
models for Experiment 2.
When looking at the performance ranking of models based
on the different feature sets (see Figure 9), we see that it
is different from the ranking in Experiment 1. For example,
models based on spectral amplitude are now found to be the
best performing models, whereas they are only the fifth best
model in Experiment 1.
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FIGURE 9. Ranking of models built on different sets of audio features based on their EER performance: (a) with known features (Experiment 1) (b) with
autoencoder features and data augmentation (Experiment 2).
C. EXPERIMENT 3: PERFORMANCE OF HYBRID
SYSTEM
We explore the effectiveness of a hybrid system that com-
bines both the predictions of the models built on known
and machine learned features. The results of this experiment
are shown in Table 4 and the resulting DET curves are
shown in Figure 10. A superior performance is found when
using a logistic regression fusion to combining the output of
individual models. This could be attributed to the larger, more
diverse feature space (coming from multiple models). The
hybrid system outperforms all individual models, including
the fused results from both Experiment 1 and 2. This confirms
that each of the audio feature sets capture relevant aspects of
audio signals that, when put together, form the most powerful
model.
TABLE 4. Results from Experiment 3.
Experiment EER (Calibrated)
Experiment 1 (Fused) 12.2
Experiment 2 (Fused) 12.6
Experiment 1 and 2 (Fused) 10.8
D. COMPARISON WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART SYSTEMS
Table 5 compares the performance of our proposed system
with other systems trained on the ASVSpoof2017 dataset in
terms of EER. When comparing to other models based on
GMM, such as System 3 [65], we achieve better performance
due to our unique feature set and dataset augmentation. For
instance, with the traditional feature set from Experiment 1, a
slightly better performance than System 3 is achieved, which
uses the same core model, but less features. In Experiment
3, we further improve the accuracy of the proposed system
by integrating an autoencoder. By using this to augment
the training set and by fusing the results based on both
traditional and learned features, the EER improves by 20%,
thus reaching 10.8. The only system that outperforms our
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Figure 11 DET Curves showing the performance of detection tasks (Experiment 3) 
 
5. Conclusions 
A GMM-UBM based audio spoofing detection system has been developed and its performance was 
investigated as part of this study. GMM-UBM was trained using a variety of audio features 
FIGURE 10. DET Curves showing the performance of spoofing the detection
models for Experiment 3.
proposed architecture integrates, in addition to GMM, a
recursive neural networks [66]. It would be conceivable that
the performance of said model would also improve when
incorporating our feature learning and dataset augmentation
method. This is a topic for future research.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We examine the effect of a large variety of audio features
on the performance of a GMM-UBM based replay audio
spoofing detection system. One of the goals of this paper is to
pinpoint the most important features when building a robust
model that works on an ‘in the wild dataset’, i.e., without
having any information about the used replay spoofing tech-
nique. In addition to thoroughly comparing the models built
on the different features, we also provide a clear procedure
for proper pre-and postprocessing of these features, which
we hope will be valuable to other researchers.
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TABLE 5. EER values obtained for different models on the ASVSpoof2017 dataset with various features.
Systems EER Features classifier Fusion Training Dataset
Proposed System 10.8
MFCCs, CQCCs, Spectrogram,
LPCCs, RFCCs, LFCCs, IMFCCs,
SCMCs, SCFCs, CCCs and
Autoencoder reconstructed features
GMM Yes Training
System 1 [66] 6.73 Power Spectrum, LPCCs CNN, GMM, RNN, Total Variation Yes Training
System 2 [67] 12.34 CQCCs, MFCCs, PLP GMM-UBM, GSV-SVM, ivec-PLDA,GBDT, Random Forest Yes Training
System 3 [65] 14.03 MFCCs, IMFCCs, RFCCs, LFCCs,PLPCCs, CQCCs, SCMCs, SSFCs GMM, FF-ANN Yes Training+Development
System 4 [68] 14.66 RFCCs, MFCCs, IMFCCs, LFCCs,SSFCs, SCMCs GMM Yes Training+Development
System 5 [69] 15.97 Linear Filterbank Feature GMM, CT-DNN with convolutional layer& time-delay layers Yes Training
ASVSpoof Baseline
(B01) [13] 24.77 CQCCs GMM No Training+Development
ASVSpoof Baseline
(B02) [13] 30.6 CQCCs GMM No Training
In our experiments, we explore both known audio features,
and those learned by an autoencoder (i.e., using a feed
forward neural network). The former includes some de-facto
features often used this field, as well as some potentially new
features that would be able to distinguish genuine speech
from spoofed one. The included features are MFCCs, spec-
trogram, CQCCs, LPCCs, IMFCCs, RFCCs, LFCCs, SCFCs,
SCMCs, and CCCs. Secondly, a novel representation for each
of these feature sets is learned by an autoencoder. In addition,
this autoencoder is used to augment the training set.
The performance of each of the models built with these
different feature sets is reported in terms of EER. When
using only known features, or only autoencoder features,
the resulting performance is around 12 in terms of EER.
When creating a hybrid system that incorporates both types
of features, we achieve a superior performance of 10.8. This
competes with the current state-of-the-art and reiterates the
importance of integrating different types of audio features,
both known and machine learned, in order to develop a robust
model for replay spoofing detection.
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